://osf.io/vzp9y

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Social Norms and Weak Enforcement - A Laboratory Experiment on Tax Evasion
https://osf.io/vzp9y
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dcterms:created
2025-03-24
dcterms:dateCopyrighted
2025
dcterms:description
Widespread tax compliance is observed also in situations where sanctions are too weak to deter a rational individual from evading taxes. The list of possible explanations is long. In this project two of them are analyzed in more detail. First, the functioning of so-called weak enforcement is tested. The question is if taxpayers are following the rules although the probability of being audited and / or the sanctions size are low. Second, the effect of social norms on tax compliance is tested. The question is if normative and / or empirical expectations, the two aspects that form a social norm according to Bicchieri (2012), bring people to pay taxes. Special attention is given to the interaction of weak enforcement and social norms. We want to test if they add up, crowd themselves in or crowd themselves out. This is done in a laboratory experiment using as the main part a standard income reporting game. Enforcement regimes are varied within-subjects, social norm messages are varied between subjects. The experiment, additionally, contains a norm elicitation task, a measure for risk attitude and a test for social value orientation.
dcterms:identifier
https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/VZP9Y
https://osf.io/vzp9y
dcterms:modified
2025-03-24
dcterms:rightsHolder
Robin Scheuch
dcterms:title
Social Norms and Weak Enforcement - A Laboratory Experiment on Tax Evasion
osf:keyword
Tax Compliance
Enforcement
Social Norms
Laboratory Experiment
Law and Economics
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://osf.io/5x9en

osf:Project
Social Norms and Weak Enforcement - A Laboratory Experiment on Tax Evasion
more details...
dcterms:created
2024-12-11
dcterms:dateCopyrighted
2025
dcterms:identifier
https://osf.io/5x9en
dcterms:rightsHolder
Robin Scheuch
dcterms:title
Social Norms and Weak Enforcement - A Laboratory Experiment on Tax Evasion
dcterms:creator
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name
No license
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Public Economics
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Public Economics
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://api.osf.io/v2/subjects/584240da54be81056cecab8f

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Economics
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Economics
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://api.osf.io/v2/subjects/584240da54be81056cecab8f

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Economics
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Economics
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://api.osf.io/v2/subjects/584240da54be81056cecab02

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Behavioral Economics
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Behavioral Economics
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://api.osf.io/v2/subjects/584240da54be81056cecab8f

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Economics
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Economics
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